Human Rights Monitoring under European Union Generalised Scheme of Preferences

INTRODUCTION. This article examines the monitoring of human rights compliance in the European Union’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (hereinafter GSP) programmes. It aims to analyse how the European Union (hereinafter EU) uses trade preferences as leverage to promote human rights in developing countries, with a particular focus on the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms and withdrawal procedures. The research objectives include tracing the evolution of the EU GSP programmes, examining the current monitoring system, evaluating the recent case of Cambodia’s partial withdrawal, and identifying both strengths and limitations of the system along with potential improvements.
MATERIALS AND METHODS. The research employs multiple methodological approaches, including comprehensive document analysis of EU regulations, particularly Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 governing the current GSP programmes, and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1083/2013 detailing the withdrawal procedure. This article utilises case study analysis focusing on the recent partial withdrawal of trade preferences from Cambodia due to systematic human rights violations, particularly the dissolution of the Cambodia National Rescue Party and the arrest of its leader, Kem Sokha. Additionally, reports from the United Nations (hereinafter UN) and International Labour Organisation (hereinafter ILO) monitoring bodies, as well as EU institutions, were examined to evaluate the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms. This methodological framework allows for a systematic assessment of both formal procedures and the practical implementation of the EU’s human rights conditionality in external trade relations.
RESEARCH RESULTS. The study reveals that the EU monitoring system operates through a multi-tiered approach, ranging from enhanced engagement to initiating formal withdrawal procedures. The Cambodia case demonstrates both the merits and constrains of this system. Despite years of engagement with the European Commission, Cambodia’s human rights situation did not improve sufficiently, resulting in a partial withdrawal of the Everything But Arms (hereinafter EBA) programme preferences, which affected approximately 20 % of Cambodia’s exports to the EU. The study identifies key merits of the monitoring system: the step-by-step approach allows beneficiary countries time to address violations; evidence-based assessments from multiple sources promote objectivity; and the potential for leverage creates economic incentives for compliance. However, significant weaknesses include insufficient transparency, centralised decision-making, disproportionate impacts on vulnerable populations, and limited leverage when beneficiaries have alternative markets.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. The analysis suggests that while the EU’s GSP monitoring system provides a framework for promoting human rights through trade, substantial refinements are needed to enhance its greater effectiveness. Recommendations include establishing more defined expectations for beneficiaries based on their specific circumstances, increasing transparency through public hearings and disclosure of “issue lists”, conducting social impact assessments before implementing withdrawals, and coordinating with other developed countries to create a unified approach. The EU system stands out for its progressive GSP+ programme that employs a carrot and stick approach, but it must balance leverage with avoiding disproportionate impacts on vulnerable populations in beneficiary countries.

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