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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">mgimolaw</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Московский журнал международного права</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Moscow Journal of International Law</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0869-0049</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2619-0893</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Moscow State Institute of International Relations</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.24833/0869-0049-2025-3-6-23</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">mgimolaw-2886</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ISSUES OF THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Соответствуют ли «санкции» Европейского союза против России международному праву?</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Are European Union “Sanctions” against Russia Compatible with International Law?</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7000-7190</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Геррейро</surname><given-names>А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Guerreiro</surname><given-names>A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Александр ГЕРРЕЙРО, ассоциированный член Института политико-правовых наук, сотрудник Лиссабонского центра исследований публичного права, Юридический факультет, Лиссабонский университет</p><p>1649-014, Лиссабон, Аламеда да Универсидад</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Alexandre GUERREIRO Associate Member of the Institute of Political Legal Sciences, Collaborating Member of the Lisbon Centre for Research in Public Law, School of Law, University of Lisbon</p><p>Alameda da Universidade, Lisbon, 1649-014</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">atguerreiro@campus.ul.pt</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Юридический факультет, Лиссабонский университет Аламеда да Универсидад</institution><country>Португалия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>School of Law, University of Lisbon Alameda da Universidade</institution><country>Portugal</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>09</day><month>10</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>6</fpage><lpage>23</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Геррейро А., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Геррейро А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Guerreiro A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.mjil.ru/jour/article/view/2886">https://www.mjil.ru/jour/article/view/2886</self-uri><abstract><p>ВВЕДЕНИЕ. Принятие недружественных мер против третьих государств как способ принуждения к изменению политики не является чем-то новым для государств и может быть юридически приемлемым в конкретных случаях, определяемых Советом Безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций (далее – ООН) или соответствующих международному праву. При отсутствии связующего элемента между наказывающим и наказуемым государствами санкции являются односторонними, что в итоге равнозначно нарушению обычных принципов суверенного равенства и невмешательства, тем самым нарушая международное право. Европейский союз (далее – ЕС) стремится к применению особого подхода в отношении нескольких государств, включая Российскую Федерацию. Главная цель исследования – дать ответ на следующий вопрос: совместимы ли санкции ЕС против России с международным правом? МАТЕРИАЛЫ И МЕТОДЫ. Исследование начинается с характеристики понятия «санкции», его типологий, различных способов выражения и международно-правовой базы санкций. Далее последует оценка политической и правовой позиции ЕС в отношении санкций, которая завершается рассмотрением конкретного случая санкционного режима, принятого Брюсселем против России. В качестве основных источников в этой работе рассматриваются документы, принятые Специальным докладчиком ООН по вопросу о негативном воздействии односторонних принудительных мер на осуществление прав человека, а также правовая доктрина, судебная практика и нормативные акты. РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ. Результаты проведенного исследования демонстрируют развитие в ЕС тенденции к концентрации полномочий в Совете ЕС посредством неопределенных и произвольных нормативных актов для принятия санкций против третьих государств. Эта тенденция приобрела большую популярность и легитимность после Лиссабонского договора и обусловлена стремлением ЕС напрямую влиять на важнейшие международные события и добиваться политических изменений в государствах, против которых направлены санкции, пытаясь заставить их суверенные органы принять те же ценности и принципы, что и брюссельская организация. ОБСУЖДЕНИЕ И ВЫВОДЫ. Понятие «санкции» включает в себя два различных механизма: решения, которые, хотя и могут быть недружественными, соответствуют международному праву; и односторонние принудительные меры, которые представляют собой нарушение международного права. Несмотря на то что режим санкций ЕС публично представлен под названием «ограничительные меры», такие меры принимаются вне рамок Совета Безопасности ООН и не имеют достаточной фактической базы для обоснования таких решений, тем самым попадая под действие односторонних принудительных мер, запрещенных международным правом.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>INTRODUCTION. The adoption of unfriendly measures against third States as a way to force a policy change is not new between States and can be legally acceptable in specific cases dictated by the United Nations Security Council or when in accordance with international law. When lacking a linking element between both the punishing and the punished States, sanctions are unilateral, which, in the end, equates to a violation of the customary principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, thus violating international law. The European Union seeks the pursuance of a distinct approach against several States, including the Russian Federation. In the end, the main goal of this study is to be able to provide an answer to the following question: are EU sanctions against Russia compatible with international law? MATERIALS AND METHODS. This study begins with the characterisation of the concept of “sanctions”, its typologies, its different ways of expression and the framework of sanctions under international law. It will be followed by an assessment on the political and legal position of the European Union on sanctions to then finalize with the specific case of the sanction’s regime adopted by Brussels against Russia. This work takes into account as main sources the instruments adopted by the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, as well as legal doctrine, jurisprudence and normative elements. RESEARCH RESULTS. The result of the research conducted demonstrates the development of a trend within the European Union towards a concentration of powers in the Council of the European Union through vague and arbitrary normative instruments in order to adopt sanctions against third States. This trend gained more traction and legitimacy after the Treaty of Lisbon and is driven by the ambition of the European Union to directly influence the most significant international events and push for political changes in the targeted States, attempting to force the latters’ sovereign bodies to embrace the same values and principles as the Brussels based organization. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. The notion of “sanctions” comprises two different mechanisms: decisions which, although may be unfriendly, are in accordance with international law; and unilateral coercive measures, which constitute breaches of international law. Despite the fact that the European Union’s sanctions regime is publicly presented under the name of “restrictive measures”, in the end, such measures are adopted outside the United Nations Security Council environment and lack a factual basis enough to justify such decisions, thus fitting in the scope of unilateral coercive measures, forbidden by international law.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>санкции</kwd><kwd>односторонние принудительные меры</kwd><kwd>ограничительные меры</kwd><kwd>Европейский союз</kwd><kwd>экономическая война</kwd><kwd>суверенное равенство</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>sanctions</kwd><kwd>unilateral coercive measures</kwd><kwd>restrictive measures</kwd><kwd>European Union</kwd><kwd>economic warfare</kwd><kwd>sovereign equality</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Alì A. 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