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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">mgimolaw</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Московский журнал международного права</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Moscow Journal of International Law</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0869-0049</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2619-0893</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Moscow State Institute of International Relations</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.24833/0869-0049-2022-1-38-51</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">mgimolaw-2675</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>МАССОВАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ И МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>MASS INFORMATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Международно-правовая квалификация вредоносного использования информационно-коммуникационных технологий: в поисках консенсуса</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Qualifcation of Harmful Use of Information and Communications Technologies under International Law: In Search of a Consensus</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5838-0283</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Русинова</surname><given-names>В. Н.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Rusinova</surname><given-names>V. N.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Вера Николаевна Русинова, доктор юридических наук, профессор, руководитель департамента международного права, Факультет права</p><p>101000, Москва, ул. Мясницкая, д. 20</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Vera N. Rusinova, Doctor of Juridical Sciences, Professor, Head of the School of International Law, Faculty of Law</p><p>20, ul. Myasnitskaya, Moscow,  101000</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">vrusinova@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University “Higher School of Economics”</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>04</day><month>04</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>38</fpage><lpage>51</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Русинова В.Н., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Русинова В.Н.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Rusinova V.N.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.mjil.ru/jour/article/view/2675">https://www.mjil.ru/jour/article/view/2675</self-uri><abstract><sec><title>ВВЕДЕНИЕ</title><p>ВВЕДЕНИЕ. Интенсивная работа по конкретизации норм международного права в отношении использования информационно-коммуникационных технологий (далее – ИКТ) ведётся государствами в различных коллегиальных форматах. При этом отличительной особенностью последних лет стало активное раскрытие самими государствами своей позиции по основным дискуссионным вопросам этой повестки. Так менеджериализм стал постепенно уступать место консенсуализму, но возникает вопрос: привели ли коллективные и индивидуальные усилия государств к прояснению, по меньшей мере, ключевых проблем, связанных с международно-правовой квалификацией вредоносного использования ИКТ?</p></sec><sec><title>МАТЕРИАЛЫ И МЕТОДЫ</title><p>МАТЕРИАЛЫ И МЕТОДЫ. Данная статья призвана, учитывая как доклады Группы правительственных экспертов ООН и Рабочей группы открытого состава, так и официальные позиции отдельных государств, пролить свет на то, в какой степени и по каким вопросам применения первичных норм международного права для квалификации вредоносного использования ИКТ государствам удалось достичь консенсуса, поскольку именно он важен при выявлении как последующей практики применения международных договоров, которая устанавливает соглашение участников относительно их толкования, так и практики и opinio juris, как элементов новых международных обычаев.</p></sec><sec><title>РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ</title><p>РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ. На основании проведённого анализа было выявлено, что принцип невмешательства во внутренние дела, который признаётся государствами применимым в «киберсфере» в том же объёме, что и в других, имеет очень ограниченное значение для квалификации вредоносного использования ИКТ. Отсюда, на первый план выходит принцип уважения суверенитета. Однако правовые позиции, основанные на отрицании или, наоборот, признании нормативности принципа уважения суверенитета, постулируют невозможность применить данный принцип без конкретизации его содержания в отношении использования ИКТ. Полифоничность позиций государств не предвещает возможности достичь консенсуса по этому вопросу в обозримом будущем. Что касается норм jus ad bellum и jus in bello, то готовность большинства государств квалифицировать случаи вредоносного использования ИКТ как «применение силы» или даже «вооружённое нападе ние» даже вне рамок вооружённого конфликта, а также перерастягивать объём таких понятий международного гуманитарного права как «нападение» или «военная операция», свидетельствует о злоупотреблении «военной парадигмой» при оценке таких деяний. Ряд государств настолько далеко отходят от нормативного содержания этих понятий, что отстаивание данных подходов приобретает ограниченный юридический потенциал, и, скорее, носит политический характер, выполняя функцию сдерживания потенциальных угроз.</p></sec><sec><title>ОБСУЖДЕНИЕ И ВЫВОДЫ</title><p>ОБСУЖДЕНИЕ И ВЫВОДЫ. В статье обосновывается общий вывод о том, что консенсус о применении международного права к случаям вредоносного использования ИКТ сложился на очень высоком уровне абстракции и вряд ли выходит за пределы признания распространения сферы действия общих норм международного права на ИКТ. Это закрепляет неопределённость в качестве ключевой характеристики международно-правовой оценки соответствующих случаев и делает практически любое суждение о нюансах применения норм международного права в «киберсфере» выводом ad hoc.</p></sec></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><sec><title>INTRODUCTION</title><p>INTRODUCTION. States are seized with the question of how International Law norms should be applicable with respect to harmful use of information and communications technologies (hereinafer – ICT) in many diﬀerent collective formats. Against this background, an intensive disclosure of the states' positions is a brand new trend. So, managerialism is slowly giving way to consensualism, however, do these collective and individual efforts help to clarify, at least, the key problems connected with the qualifcation of these harmful practices?</p></sec><sec><title>MATERIALS AND METHODS</title><p>MATERIALS AND METHODS. Being based on the analysis of the reports of the UN Group of Governmental Experts and the Open-Ended Working Group, as well as the ofcial positions articulated by states, this article seeks to reveal on which questions and in which volume states have managed to achieve a consensus on the qualifcation of harmful cyber activities under International Law. Tis question is crucial for the identifcation of the subsequent practice in the application of international treaties which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding their interpretation, as well as the practice and opinio juris as elements of international customs.</p></sec><sec><title>RESEARCH RESULTS</title><p>RESEARCH RESULTS. Te research confrmed that the principle of non-intervention into domestic aﬀairs, albeit its full applicability in cyber context is not being questioned by the states, has a very limited significance for the qualifcation of the harmful use of ICTs, which brings to the forefront the principle of sovereignty. However, the states' ofcial positions, based on a denial or, vise versa, an afrmation of this principle as a separate rule, postulate the impossibility to apply the principle of sovereignty without concretization of its content in the cyber context. Te polyphony of the approaches does not foreshadow a possibility to reach consensus on this issue in the nearest future. With respect to the jus ad bellum and jus in bello norms, the readiness of the majority of states to qualify the cases of harmful use of ICTs as a 'use of force' or even an 'armed attack', and to overstretch the scope of the International Humanitarian Law notions of an 'attack' or 'military operation', is described as being indicative of the abuse of the 'military paradigm' to assess these activities. Approaches of some states go beyond the normative scope of these notions so far that their assertion loses legal signifcance and seems to have rather a political character by primarily fulflling the deterrent function.</p><p>DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. Te article concludes by diagnosing that a consensus between states on the application of International law to harmful ICT practices has been reached at a very high level of abstraction and hardly transcends the limits of the general acknowledgment of the applicability of International law in the cybersphere. Tis fact enshrines the indeterminacy as the main feature of the qualifcation of harmful use of ICTs under International law and renders almost every stance on nuances of the application of International law to these acts to be an ad hoc one.</p></sec></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>кибероперации</kwd><kwd>информационно-коммуникационные технологии</kwd><kwd>международная информационная безопасность</kwd><kwd>применение силы</kwd><kwd>вооружённый конфликт</kwd><kwd>международное гуманитарное право</kwd><kwd>стандарты</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>cyberoperations</kwd><kwd>information and communications technologies</kwd><kwd>international information security</kwd><kwd>use of force</kwd><kwd>armed conﬂict</kwd><kwd>International Humanitarian Law</kwd><kwd>standards</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Ромашкина Н. П. 2020. 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